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Abstract
The BP Oil Spill of 2010 was one of the largest in history. Although the lessons of 
the BP Spill are most immediately relevant to the United States, they have broader 
implications for Brazil and other countries. It is no secret that the regulatory system 
functioned poorly in the era before the spill, providing little incentive for industry 
to exercise care. Post-spill reforms should be an improvement. The U.S. government 
took the spill seriously and sought major penalties. These penalties are measured in 
billions of dollars. In the meantime, a multi-billion dollar class action settlement has 
also resulted from the spill. Actions to recover for harm to natural resources and 
ecosystems are still in preparation. Hopefully, the lessons learned from this deplor-
able event will be instructive not only for the United States but for other nations such 
as Brazil that are involved in deepwater oil drilling.
Keywords: Environmental Law, Disaster Law, oil drilling.
Resumo
O derramamento de óleo da BP de 2010 foi um dos maiores na história. Embora as 
lições desse derramamento sejam mais imediatamente relevantes para os Estados 
Unidos, elas possuem implicações mais amplas para o Brasil e outros países. Não é 
nenhum segredo que o sistema regulador funcionava mal na época precedente ao 
vazamento, proporcionando pouco incentivo para que a indústria adotasse os devi-
dos cuidados. As reformas realizadas pós-derrame devem apresentar melhorias no 
sistema. O governo dos EUA considerou o derrame um fato grave e procurou aplicar 
grandes penalidades. Tais sanções são medidas em bilhões de dólares. Nesse meio 
tempo, um multibilionário acordo judicial também resultou do derramamento. Ações 
para a recuperação dos danos aos recursos naturais e ecossistemas estão ainda em 
preparação. Esperemos que as lições tiradas deste evento deplorável se tornem ins-
trutivas não só para os Estados Unidos, mas para outras nações, como o Brasil, que 
estão envolvidas na exploração de petróleo em águas profundas.
Palavras-chave: Direito Ambiental, Direito dos Desastres, perfuração de óleo.
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Introduction
The BP Oil Spill of 2010 was one of the largest 
in history. It has already given rise to an extensive legal 
literature and, as we will see, extensive litigation.2 The 
post-spill developments have useful implications about 
how to structure risk regulation to prevent future spills 
as much as possible. The litigation also sheds light on the 
question of how to compensate spill victims effi ciently 
and fairly. Although the lessons of the BP Spill are most 
immediately relevant to the United States, they have 
broader implications.
Oil spills are obviously not a uniquely U.S. phe-
nomenon. For instance, Brazil also suffered a major oil 
spill not long after the BP Spill, although the spill was 
fortunately less drastic than the American spill. On No-
vember 7, 2011, a pressure spike occurred during the 
drilling of an exploratory well at a depth of 1000 meters 
about 120 kilometers offshore. According to Chevron, 
although the well was immediately sealed, leakage began 
from the seabed nearby and continued for four days. 
Chevron was fi ned 50 million reals, and it was reported 
that authorities were considering indictments against 
employees who were involved in the leak (Carroll and 
Spinetto, 2011). In addition, a federal prosecutor fi led a 
lawsuit for $11 billion in damages against Chevron al-
leging that “Chevron and Transocean were not capable 
of controlling the damages caused by the leakage” and 
that there was “evidence of a lack of planning and en-
vironmental management by the companies” (Reuters, 
2011)3. Criminal charges were later dropped, and Chev-
ron entered into a settlement to pay $175 million to 
settle civil damage claims (Reuters, 2013)4. Concerns 
have also been expressed about the risk assessments 
used for drilling operations offshore of Brazil.5 Notably, 
the Brazilian coastal zone has similarities with the U.S. 
Gulf Coast in terms of tourism and fi shing industries, 
making similar kinds of harm foreseeable (Sousa, 2011).
In the aftermath of the BP Spill, “Brazil’s environ-
mental agency and navy drafted a national contingency 
plan for responding to offshore oil spills to complement 
a federal law enacted in 2000 that made operators on 
Brazil’s offshore platforms responsible for spill preven-
tion and clean-up” (Weaver, 2014b, p. 194). As in the U.S., 
Brazilian law provides for penalties and liability in the 
event of a spill:
Importantly, all concession agreements make clear 
that the producer “will be fully responsible for all dam-
ages and losses to the environment that arise, directly 
or indirectly, from the execution of their operations.” 
Fines for violating environmental law appear to be or-
dered through IBAMA, a lead federal environmental 
agency. The Environmental Crimes Act of 1998 bol-
stered the environmental agencies’ enforcement pow-
ers and increased the potential fi ne amounts (Sousa, 
2011, p. 87).
Like the U.S., Brazil also has a class action mecha-
nism that could be used by spill victims, although Brazil-
ian law apparently does not provide for a private claim-
settlement system, and the litigation process seems to 
be even slower than in the U.S. (Sousa, 2011). Thus, the 
two legal schemes have common elements.
Yet, as the post-spill developments have unfolded 
in the United States, there may be additional lessons 
for Brazil from the U.S. experience.6 Fortunately, Brazil 
has not yet had to cope with a mega-spill like the BP 
Deepwater Horizon blowout. The sheer scale of such 
events presents unique challenges in terms of post-di-
saster legal consequences, and the potential for such a 
mega-spill may require a thorough reconsideration of 
the adequacy of regulatory safety measures.
After this introduction, this article begins in Part II
by describing the BP spill and its impact on the U.S. Gulf 
Coast. The spill had widespread economic impacts that 
went well beyond the obvious damage to beaches and 
fi sheries. It also had ecological impacts that scientists 
are still seeking to understand. 
The article then considers the regulatory lessons 
of the spill in Part III. It is no secret that the regulatory 
system functioned poorly in the era before the spill, 
providing little incentive for industry to exercise care. 
The temptation to skimp on safety in order to maxi-
mize profi ts is, unfortunately, a universal one. Regula-
2 For some particularly useful articles, see Aldy (2011); Gilles (2012); Issacharoff and Rave (2014); Osofsky et al. (2012); Randle et al. (2013); Uhlmann (2011); Viscusi 
and Zeckhauser (2011); Weaver (2014a, 2014b). For a useful update on matters relating to the spill, see Ramseur and Hagerty (2014). For English language materials on 
relevant Brazilian law, see Sousa (2011).
3 For a discussion of the contrasting roles of environmental criminal law in the United States and Brazil, see Blomquist, (2011); McAllister (2008).
4 Chevron also paid $14 million to settle fi nes in a later spill that did not reach shore (Forbes, 2012).
5 John Vidal (2010) states that: “The platform is now operating 125km off the coast of  Brazil in 1,798 metres (5,900 feet) of water—deeper than BP’s Deepwater rig that 
exploded in April and led to the disastrous  oil  spill in the Gulf of Mexico [T]he 14-page environment report prepared by the [bank fi nancing the drilling operations] 
makes no mention of blowouts or the equipment needed to prevent them. Ministers have edited out all ECDG’s comments assessing the risks involved in deep-sea 
drilling in the Atlantic.”
6 A very useful comparison of U.S. and Brazilian efforts is provided by Sousa (2011).
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tors must instead foster the development of a culture of 
safety within the industry. This presents particular chal-
lenges because the wealth and political power of the 
oil industry, plus the complacency that results from the 
infrequency of major accidents, can create powerful re-
sistance to vigorous government oversight.
The remainder of the article considers the mas-
sive legal liabilities created by the spill, mostly on the 
part of BP. Part IV considers the criminal and civil penal-
ties imposed on BP. The U.S. government took the spill 
seriously and sought major penalties. These penalties 
are measured in billions of dollars. Notably, they have 
been used to help fi nance scientifi c work and recovery 
measures in the affected area. Compensation to victims 
is also an issue. Part V considers the multi-billion dollar 
settlement covering economic loss and the forthcom-
ing actions to recover for ecological damage. Although 
major oil companies have tremendous resources, these 
fi nancial liabilities should be large enough to focus in-
dustry attention on the need for safety.
In the post-spill period, much has been learned 
about the accident itself and the regulatory failures that 
contributed to it. We have also had the opportunity to ob-
serve reform of regulation in the U.S., and the ways that 
the legal system can contribute to deterrence of risky be-
havior and compensation for victims. Hopefully, the lessons 
learned from this deplorable event will be instructive not 
only for the United States but for other nations such as 
Brazil that are involved in deepwater oil drilling. 
The BP Oil Spill and Its Aftermath
The Gulf of Mexico received national and even 
international headlines for many weeks during the BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill. The spill is described in 
Part A of this section, while its direct human impacts 
are discussed in Part B and its ecosystem impacts are 
discussed in Part C. Despite the intensive investigations 
that have already taken place, it may be years before we 
fully understand the dynamics of the accident and its 
consequences.
The Spill
It is best to begin with the spill itself. On April 20, 
2010, while drilling at the Macondo Prospect about 52 
miles southeast of Venice, Louisiana, an explosion on the 
Deepwater Horizon caused by a blowout killed 11 of 
126 crewmen (Associated Press, 2010a). Workers who 
were shutting down the exploratory well were unaware 
that it was leaking natural gas, perhaps because they 
were distracted by a test they were performing. The 
gas rushed to surface, ignited, and exploded (Uhlmann, 
2011, p. 1422-1423). Two days later, despite efforts to 
put out the blaze on the oilrig, the Deepwater Horizon 
sank in 5000 feet of water (Associated Press, 2010b)7. 
The blowout was an accident, but it was also the 
foreseeable result of inattention to important safety 
issues. BP simply had not given suffi cient attention to 
safety before the accident:
BP chose a single-tube well design that [...] provided 
fewer barriers to contain gas within the well than 
other well designs. BP decided to use a single cement 
plug and fewer centralizers than Haliburton [an ex-
pert sub-contractor] had recommended. BP cancelled 
a bond cement test that might have revealed prob-
lems with the cement seal. These problems were com-
pounded by other errors, including the failure to cir-
culate drilling mud adequately, which helps the cement 
cure; the replacement of drilling mud with seawater, 
which made it easier for gas to escape, and the mis-
reading of pressure tests conducted hours before the 
blowout, which should have revealed the instability of 
the cement seal (Uhlmann, 2011, p. 1440).
Safety problems with other BP operations con-
fi rmed that the problem was widespread throughout 
the organization: “BP stressed production and effi ciency 
over safety and failed to address systemic problems 
in its environmental compliance programs even after 
criminal (and civil) violations occurred at BP facilities” 
(Uhlmann, 2011, p. 1432).
The seriousness of the event was initially under-
estimated. On April 23, the Department of Homeland 
Security stated the incident “poses a negligible risk to 
regional oil supply markets and will not cause signifi cant 
national economic impacts” (Goldenberg, 2010). White 
House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs, too, minimized 
the nature of the incident, announcing, “I doubt this is 
the fi rst accident that has happened and I doubt it will 
be the last” (Goldenberg, 2010). However, on this same 
date, President Obama issued a statement identifying 
the blowout as a “number one” priority, and BP offi cials 
acknowledged the threat of catastrophic environmental 
consequences (Goldenberg, 2010).
After the initial accident, attention turned to the 
leakage of oil from the well. On April 24, oil was con-
fi rmed to be leaking from the well, and the next day the 
U.S. Coast Guard announced its intention to use re-
7 For a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the spill, see National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2010, p. 89-122). 
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mote underwater vehicles to stop the leak. Throughout 
the end of April, May, and June, estimates of the fl ow of 
oil increased from 1,000 barrels of crude per day (bpd), 
to 5000 bpd, to as many as 60,000 bpd (Gillis, 2010). For 
perspective, this could mean that an amount of oil equal 
to the entire Exxon Valdez spill could have been gushing 
into the Gulf of Mexico every four days (Gillis, 2010). 
At least one expert predicted the spill fl ow was even 
higher than 60,000 bpd (Harris, 2010). 
In May, Congress learned that BP, Halliburton, 
and Transocean ignored safety warnings in the hours 
before the Deepwater explosion, and a group of Min-
erals Management Service scientists claimed they were 
pressured to change the fi ndings of internal studies if 
they predicted a substantial danger of an accident or 
harm to the Gulf ecosystem. On May 16, BP began to 
draw some of the spewing oil up to the surface using a 
tube inserted into the leaking pipe; however, this strat-
egy proved largely ineffective at recovering a substantial 
portion of the oil (Harris, 2010). The oil posed an imme-
diate threat to the safety of seafood from the area. On 
May 18, the no fi shing zone covered nineteen percent or 
about 90,000 square miles of the Gulf of Mexico (Har-
ris, 2010). BP announced on June 6 that a containment 
cap was capturing 10,000 bpd (Harris, 2010). On July 7, 
the Associated Press released an investigation indicating 
that there are 27,000 abandoned oil wells in the Gulf, 
some dating back to the 1940s, and many badly sealed 
(Harris, 2010). This investigation thus forced the public 
to confront the possibility that other major leaks were 
possible. On July 15, BP fi nally stopped the fl ow of oil 
for the fi rst time in nearly three months (Harris, 2010). 
And about three weeks later on August 4, BP executed 
a successful ‘static kill’, and a cement plug introduced on 
September 19 left the well effectively dead and the crisis 
offi cially over (Harris, 2010).
BP and others also engaged in extensive activities 
to recover oil, break up oil slicks, and respond to coastal 
impacts on the over-1000 miles of affected seashore. 
BP spent $14 billion on such activities, and at its peak, 
almost 50,000 people were employed in the response 
effort (Ramseur and Haggerty, 2014, p. 2). As we will 
see, these direct expenditures were only the beginning 
of the company’s fi nancial liability, which has included 
criminal fi nes, voluntary damage payments, a class action 
settlement, and pending civil penalties – each of which 
was measured in billions of dollars.
Direct Human Impacts
Columbia University’s National Center for Di-
saster Preparedness interviewed 1,200 adults on the 
Gulf Coast during the oil spill and found that the spill 
had seriously impacted economic viability of Gulf Coast 
communities (Columbia University’s Mailman School of 
Public Health, 2010). The most direct impacts fell on the 
fi shing industry. But the follow-on impacts were also se-
vere on such industries as tourism, real estate, restau-
rants, seafood processors, and communities dependent 
on those industries. Moreover, the impacts did not fall 
evenly, raising issues of environmental justice.
African Americans, Southeast Asians, and Native 
Americans in the region are often heavily dependent on 
the seafood industry for jobs. After the spill, Environ-
mental Justice advocates called attention to the plight 
of communities of color and Native Americans, groups 
that have historically been overlooked (McGinnis, 2010). 
In response to concerns that the oil spill was having 
disproportionate effects on minority communities, EPA 
Administrator Lisa Jackson added staff to incorporate 
environmental justice concerns, including access to bet-
ter consultation with government and environmental 
testing information (Schleifstein, 2010). “People of the 
Gulf Coast need our support today more than ever be-
fore”, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson said (Schleifstein, 
2010). “The people who are most vulnerable to the im-
pacts of this spill must be empowered during our re-
sponse and the long-term recovery”, Jackson concluded 
(Schleifstein, 2010).
Before oil and gas development, the Gulf Coast 
was primarily used for fi shing, trapping, and transporta-
tion (Verchick, 2010, p. 16). Even today, it is home to 
fi shing communities with unique history and cultures. 
The earliest non-native inhabitants of the coast were 
refugee Acadians (Cajuns) from Canada. The Cajuns are 
the descendants of the Acadians expelled from modern 
day Nova Scotia and resettled in the marshes of Louisi-
ana. Cajuns settled on the coast because other cultures 
had already laid claim to much of the inland territory, 
but they found that there was little agricultural land 
available among the marsh and swamp lands (Padgett, 
1968). Traditionally farmers, the displaced Acadians were 
forced to adapt to a lifestyle focused on fi shing. From 
these unique marshland beginnings, the Cajuns of Loui-
siana developed a distinct and complex cultural identity, 
expressed in language, food, dance, folklore, and other 
traditions. Cajun culture is not unitary; rather, “Cajun 
identity is so distinct that each town often has its own 
cuisine, musical style, and dialect” (Guarino, 2010). 
The oil spill threatened Cajun culture because it 
challenges traditional fi shing livelihoods, and threatens 
to undermine the Cajun tradition of self-reliance. Many 
of the small fi shing communities in the Louisiana coast-
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al zone have been in existence for 200 years or more 
(Guarino, 2010). These communities turned to capturing 
“fi sh, crawfi sh, frogs, and the collection of Spanish moss 
(used for mattress fi ller),” and selling these products to 
nearby New Orleans (Guarino, 2010). As fi shing tech-
nology developed, in the 1950s and ‘60s, these com-
munities increasingly relied on saltwater fi sheries and 
shellfi sheries for their livelihood (Guarino, 2010).
The Vietnamese community in the Gulf provides 
a powerful example of how certain minority groups 
faced particular dangers after the oil spill. Many Vietnam-
ese in the Gulf are refugees whose families have fi shed 
for generations before coming to the Gulf (Guarino, 
2010). Many Vietnamese in the region do not possess 
other job skills. Furthermore, many in this Vietnamese 
community have poor English language skills, and ad-
justing to depleted fi sheries will thus involve this ad-
ditional language hurdle (Guarino, 2010). During the oil 
spill crisis, the federal government also did not do well 
at communicating the details of the fi shing closures to 
non-English speakers (Guarino, 2010). Some older Viet-
namese fi shermen were stopped and fi ned because they 
did not know that areas were closed to fi shing (Guarino, 
2010).8 
Perhaps the greatest cause for concern in the 
environmental justice community has been the disposal 
of oil-related debris in communities of color. BP has 
been relying on landfi lls in neighborhoods where mainly 
blacks, Latinos, and Asians live (Bullard, 2010). BP’s fed-
erally approved waste disposal plan ships oil spill gar-
bage to nine dump sites in the South (Bullard, 2010). 
In fi ve out of nine of the facilities, minorities comprise 
a majority of residents living near the disposal facilities 
(Bullard, 2010). People of color comprise about 26% of 
the population in coastal counties (Bullard, 2010)9. The 
disproportionate environmental burden BP’s dumping 
plan places on minority communities compounds the 
burden these communities already bear: the Hurricane 
Katrina recovery, economic paralysis, and racial inequal-
ity (Chen, 2010).
Although some groups may have been especially 
vulnerable to the impacts of the spill, the impacts were 
also felt more broadly. Tourism immediately suffered be-
cause of fears that beaches and coastal waters would 
be fouled. Because the spill occurred in the middle of a 
severe recession, many of those who suffered economic 
harm found it diffi cult to recover.
Environmental Impacts
The Gulf of Mexico is a unique and valuable eco-
system. Although the oil leak has long since ended, there 
are continued disputes over the environmental impacts 
of the spill. For example, it is unclear to what extent oil 
will continue to wash up on the Gulf coast, whether 
species such as the dwarf seahorse can overcome the 
loss of so much of its habitat, and whether dispersants 
used during cleanup efforts may have unforeseen conse-
quences on the environment (Chen, 2010)10.
The Gulf is home to twenty-eight species of ma-
rine mammals, including six which are listed under the 
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) as endangered. Five 
species of turtles in the region are listed under the ESA. 
These animals are focused in areas that provide shelter, 
feedings, and places suitable for reproduction. In addi-
tion, the Gulf ’s coastal wetlands provide many ecological 
services: 
In addition to storm protection services, the Louisiana 
coastal plain provides many other benefi ts. It offers 
habitat for countless species, including commercially 
signifi cant sea life and waterfowl. Fisheries in the Gulf 
of Mexico provide about 20 percent of all seafood 
consumed in the United States. Nearly all of that catch 
is dependent, in some way, on the universe of micro-
scopic plant and animal life fi rst nurtured in the coastal 
plain. With more than fi ve million birds wintering in 
Louisiana, the Louisiana coastal plain provides crucial 
rest stops to migrating birds. Finally, Louisiana’s coastal 
marshes provide services that are vital to water qual-
ity.  [...] The coast’s storm protection, habitat, and wa-
ter treatment services, while impossible to precisely 
quantify, surely amount to billions of dollars of com-
mercial benefi t per year (Verchick, 2010, p. 18-19)11.
The environmental impacts of the spill are still 
not fully understood, though they seem to have been 
less than many observers had feared: 
“In many regards, we were fortunate”, said 
Oregon State University marine biologist Jane 
Lubchenco, director of the National Oceanic 
8 Roughly one-fi fth of the Southeast Asian immigrants on the Gulf Coast are fi shermen (National Commission, 2010, p. 193).
9 For more extensive discussion of this and other environmental issues, see Osofsky et al. (2012).
10 The diffi culties encountered in closing the well are discussed in National Commission (2010, p. 129-170).
11 According to the National Commission (2010, p. 186-187), the Gulf Coast produces more than one-third of domestic seafood supply, diverse fi sh nursery and feeding 
grounds, and “some of the best beaches and waters in the United States for recreation and tourism”. According to Chen (2010, p. 187), “Coastal tourism and commercial 
fi sheries generate more than $40 billion of economic activity annually in the fi ve Gulf States”.
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and Atmospheric Administration at the time of 
the spill. “Much of the oil disappeared relatively 
quickly, thanks to the existence of bacteria (in 
the Gulf of Mexico), many of which we didn’t 
know about, the warm water of the Gulf, and 
the bathtub sloshing circulation of the Gulf, all 
of which contributed to its quick consumption 
by those bacteria.
“But there were likely acute impacts (to or-
ganisms) before the oil disappeared, and, in 
fact, some of the oil did indeed come ashore, 
and continues to be suspended in the environ-
ment”, she said.
“So, it could have been much worse, but the 
caution is that we still don’t fully know the true 
nature, the true extent of the damage, which 
is why it’s so important that the ongoing dam-
age assessment efforts continue” (Schleifstein, 
2014).
Nonetheless, there are disturbing indications of 
long-term impacts on some coastal areas where oil may 
have persisted and in terms of effects on some marine 
animals (Schleifstein, 2014).
It is important to place the incremental impacts 
in the context of the Gulf ’s existing environmental prob-
lems. When the BP Oil Spill began, the Gulf of Mexico 
was already suffering the effects of a century of environ-
mental neglect. The spill was simply the latest blow to a 
damaged ecosystem. Since the 1930s, one-third of Loui-
siana’s wetlands have disappeared (Wells, 2010). Data 
from a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service wetlands survey 
conducted every ten years shows that, though the rate 
of loss has slowed, Louisiana is still losing 32,000 acres 
of wetland every year (EPA, 2010). At the current rate 
of wetland loss, by the year 2040, Louisiana will have lost 
more than one million acres of coastal wetlands since 
1978. As a result, fi sheries could decline by 30% and 
wildlife dependent on the marshes would suffer (Coast-
al Wetlands, Protection and Restoration Act Managing 
Agencies, 1997). Louisiana’s wetlands account for 40% 
of total wetlands in the continental United States, and 
the state also accounts for 80% of wetlands lost (Perhay, 
2000, p. 155). Thus, any oil damage to remaining wetlands 
may be especially signifi cant given the increasing value 
of preserving the shrinking wetland area. Like the envi-
ronmental impact of the spill, the economic impact was 
amplifi ed because of preexisting vulnerabilities.
After the end of the spill, the government was 
faced with several major questions: Why did the spill 
occur, and how could future spills be avoided? What 
sanctions should be imposed to deter future spills? 
How should the victims of the spill be compensated? 
We consider these questions in the next three sec-
tions of the article.
Regulatory Lessons from the Spill
There is always a temptation, after a serious di-
saster, to focus on the time after the events – the emer-
gency response and the efforts to compensate victims 
and allow them to rebuild. To the extent that the causes 
are considered, it is easy to fashion blame on some of 
the workers on the scene for making imperfect deci-
sions. But this focus on individuals is often misleading. 
When mistakes are made on the scene, they are often 
due to poor training, bad incentives, failed oversight, or 
organizational fl aws that go beyond particular individu-
als. The BP Spill illustrates this principle. The spill was by 
no means caused by circumstances beyond human con-
trol. Specifi c failures by government and industry were 
to blame.
After a thorough investigation into the causes 
of the spill, a Presidential Commission identifi ed the 
“root causes” as management failures by industry and 
a dysfunctional regulatory system (National Commis-
sion, 2010, p. 122-127). The accident “resulted from clear 
mistakes made in the fi rst instance by BP, Halliburton, 
and Transocean, and by government offi cials who, relying 
too much on industry’s assertions of the safety of their 
operations, failed to create and apply a program of regu-
latory oversight that would have properly minimized 
the risks of deepwater drilling” (National Commission, 
2010, p. 127). As one commentator has said, “One theme 
that runs through the many reports on the Macondo 
disaster is that the individual workers on the rig, BP as 
a company, and the offshore industry as a whole had 
become complacent about the safety of drilling in deep-
water where high pressure-high temperature (HPHT) 
wells are common” (Weaver, 2014a, p. 161). In terms 
of regulation, as another commentator has observed, 
“[a]n under-resourced regulator, subject to the politi-
cal winds of Congressional and Executive funding and 
oversight, could not prevail against a pro-industry ide-
ology that treated additional regulation as a nuisance”, 
especially in the absence of a large spill in over 25 years 
(Weaver, 2014b, p. 381). Inspections by the regulatory 
agency were virtually a joke (Weaver, 2014b, p. 383). For 
instance, of over 2000 inspections, only 50 had follow-
up inspections to see if violations had been corrected 
(Weaver, 2014b, p. 384). A report by independent ex-
perts soon after the spill reported that the agency had 
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failed almost completely as a safety regulator (Weaver, 
2014b, p. 385). 
In response to the accident and the fi ndings of 
these experts, the regulatory landscape shifted quickly:
Industry professionals who knew the many gaps that 
existed in the U.S regulatory framework for offshore 
safety presented the Obama administration with a list 
of immediately actionable recommendations to enact 
into requirements. In a nanosecond compared to years 
past, the newly restructured federal safety regulator 
passed requirement after requirement, many based on 
industry recommended practices and standards that 
it had not been able to implement before crude oil 
started washing ashore in Louisiana. International in-
dustry trade associations, notably the IADC and the 
OGP, were agents of change in all three areas, pushing 
the United States to move to Europe’s higher stan-
dards while also strengthening Europe’s safety frame-
work (Weaver, 2014a, p. 205).
Important changes resulted. The government 
agency was restructured, and a new approach to achiev-
ing safety was adopted in order to reduce confl icts of 
interest. Confl icts of interest, according to one observ-
er, may be a particular concern in Brazil since Petrobras 
is majority-owned by the government (Sousa, 2011), so 
it is important to ensure that regulators are as free as 
possible from political pressures to cut corners in the 
interests of profi t. 
In the United States, the new regulatory ap-
proach relies primarily on what is called the Safety Case 
approach, which is “basically a self-regulatory system” 
(Weaver, 2014b, p. 402). The Safety Case is a written 
demonstration that the facility and the operation are 
“capable of providing a safe working environment for 
personnel and that there are suffi cient barriers to re-
duce identifi ed hazards and risks to ‘as low as reason-
ably practicable’ or ‘ALARP’, the common European 
standard for environmental and safety risk reduction” 
(Weaver, 2014a, p. 191). Indeed, as one commentator 
reports:
The most important effect of Macondo was the rapid 
importation into the Gulf of lessons learned from the 
North Sea to better assure that well failure would not 
occur in the future. Virtually overnight, a safety man-
agement system, often likened to the “Safety Case” 
regime used in the North Sea, was transported from 
European waters to the Gulf of Mexico. While differing 
signifi cantly from the Safety Case regime actually used 
in Norway and the United Kingdom, the new Ameri-
can “Workplace Safety Rule,” also called the “SEMS 
rule” (for Safety and Environment Management Sys-
tem), requires offshore operators, for the fi rst time, to 
have in place a “comprehensive management program 
for identifying, addressing and managing operational 
safety hazards and impacts” (Weaver, 2014a, p. 191).
The industry was also required to create a semi-
independent expert group to monitor safety and make 
recommendations (Weaver, 2014b, p. 403-406). The 
agency’s main goal is to ensure that industry members 
are doing rigorous safety audits and implementing cor-
rections (Weaver, 2014b, p. 403-406). Without the BP 
Spill, it is doubtful that industry members would have 
taken their self-regulatory roles very seriously. But the 
fi nancial repercussions of the spill on BP have been large 
enough so that even a major oil company would regard 
them as non-trivial. Even more importantly, the spill re-
sulted in a moratorium on drilling in the Gulf that was 
very costly for industry (Weaver, 2014b, p. 414). Conse-
quently, the industry members now have an interest in 
taking safety more seriously, and in making sure other 
industry members do so as well to avoid the possibility 
of another moratorium.
In any event, more remains to be done. The in-
dustry needs a system for reporting “near misses” that 
would help inform safety measures (Weaver, 2014b, 
p. 485). Equally importantly, the government has a press-
ing need to increase its own expertise as a regulator to 
provide “robust oversight” of private safety measures 
(Weaver, 2014b, p. 494). It also needs much fuller data 
than it currently receives along with this expertise, if it 
is to become as successful as the Norwegian and British 
regulators (Weaver, 2014b, p. 483).
Safety regulation is especially diffi cult when an 
industry is using a cutting edge technology, requiring 
great expertise to understand. Insuring safety through 
detailed rules and frequent inspection is likely to be 
ineffective when the industry is large, regulatory bud-
gets are limited, and the relevant expertise is mostly 
held by the industry. Yet industry cannot be expected to 
regulate itself. Even the threat of large liability may be 
ineffective when key members of an organization have 
short time horizons or have convinced themselves that 
there is no chance of an accident. All of this proved to 
be true in the BP situation. The problem is compounded 
because governments often have a fi nancial interest in 
expansion of offshore drilling. 
The Safety Case approach is probably not fool-
proof, but it seems to be the best available option. There 
is always a risk that industry will not take the Safety 
Case exercise seriously enough and that government 
oversight will be lax. But creating a regulatory agency 
with enough expertise, independence, and manpower 
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for intensive inspection and constant updating of regula-
tions is probably even more diffi cult as a practical mat-
ter. In order to ensure that all parties attend vigorously 
to safety, it is important for them to realize that major 
safety failures will result in very serious consequences. 
Thus, the issues of criminal and civil liability discussed in 
the next sections help motivate serious engagement by 
industry with the Safety Case approach.
Criminal Liability
Because of the extent of industry safety viola-
tions, the federal government brought criminal charges 
against BP and others. BP agreed to plead guilty and 
pay a $4 billion dollar fi ne for various criminal offenses, 
some arising from the loss of life on the oil rig:
BP agreed to plead guilty to 11 felony counts 
of “misconduct or neglect of ships’ offi cers.” 
Jane Barrett, an environmental law professor at 
the University of Maryland, said the seaman’s 
manslaughter statute, fi rst passed in 1838 in 
response to steamboat accidents, has a lower 
threshold for guilt including “misconduct, negli-
gence or inattention to duties.”
BP also agreed to plead guilty to one misde-
meanor count under the Clean Water Act; one 
misdemeanor count under the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act; and one felony count of obstruction 
of Congress (Mufson, 2013).
Of the $4 billion, $1.2 billion was the criminal 
fi ne, nearly of all of it under the Clean Water Act (Ran-
dle et al., 2013, p. 10311). The company also agreed to 
probation, which involved close government monitoring 
of BP’s operations (Randle et al., 2013, p. 10311). The 
Clean Water Act provides several criminal penalties for 
violation. Under section 309(c), negligent violations of 
the statute can be punished with a fi ne of $2,500-25,000 
per day of violation and up to one year in prison. The 
fi ne doubles and the prison sentence goes up to six 
years for knowing violations. Moreover, under a relative-
ly obscure statutory provision, fi nes can be increased 
up to the amount of the victim’s economic loss, which 
in the case of BP was much larger (Randle et al., 2013, 
p. 10312). Moreover, a side effect of the agreement was 
to suspend BP’s rights to bid on contracts with the fed-
eral government, a major fi nancial issue (Randle et al., 
2013, p. 10317).
There is considerable debate about the proper 
role of criminal punishment in environmental law (Uhl-
mann, 2011, p. 1448). In the BP case, arguments for crimi-
nal liability include the possibility that the company was 
actually reckless and so deserving of punishment, that 
punishment will incentivize future care by BP and other 
companies, and because criminal charges express the se-
riousness of the misconduct in dealing with such a poten-
tially harmful technology (Uhlmann, 2011, p. 1448-1455).
Of the $4 billion paid by BP to settle the criminal 
case, $2.7 billion was paid in the form of penalties to 
support scientifi c research (Randle et al., 2013, p. 10311).
Specifi cally, the funds were distributed as follows:
(i)  $2.394 billion to the National Fish and Wildlife 
Foundation (NFWF) to support restoration 
efforts in the Gulf states. 
(ii)  $1.15 billion to the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund to help fund compensation for future 
spills.
(iii)  $350 million to the National Academy of Sci-
ences for oil spill prevention and response 
research. 
(iv)  $100 million to the North American Wet-
lands Conservation Fund. 
(v)  $6 million to the General Treasury (Ramseur 
and Haggerty, 2014, p. 8). Notably, this was 
less than one percent of the total amount, 
even though criminal fi nes would typically be 
sent to the Treasury.
Thus, the fi nes were not used to help balance 
the government’s budget. Instead, they were almost en-
tirely used to address the effects of this particular spill, 
prevention or compensation measures relating to future 
spills, or other environmental issues in coastal areas.
In additional to criminal penalties, section 309 of 
the Clean Water Act provides for civil penalties to be 
assessed by EPA of up to $10,000 per day. The amount 
of the penalty is set based on “the nature, circumstances, 
extent, and gravity of the violation, or violations, and with 
respect to the violator, ability to pay, any prior history 
of such violations, the degree of culpability, economic 
benefi t, or savings (if any) resulting from the violation, 
and such other matters as justice may require” (CWA 
§ 319(g)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(3)). Section 311(b)(7) 
provides civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day of vio-
lation – or more signifi cantly for BP, up to $1,000 per 
barrel of oil or $3000 if the spill was willfully negligent 
or due to gross misconduct.
The culpability issue is obviously crucial, since it 
would raise the cap by a factor of three. It would also in-
fl uence the extent of the penalty within the cap (Randle 
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et al., 2013, p. 10316). The issue is whether the violations 
were “knowing” as opposed to simply being negligent. 
According to one expert: 
The courts of appeals have uniformly held that ‘know-
ingly’ requires proof that the defendant had knowl-
edge of the facts that constitute the violation: knowl-
edge of the law is not required. For example, in a 
hazardous waste disposal case, courts have required 
the government to show that the defendant knew that 
(1) the material involved was waste; (2) the waste had 
the substantial potential to be harmful to public health 
or the environment; and (3) the waste was disposed 
(Uhlmann, 2011, p. 1455).
A special statute passed by Congress, called the 
RESTORE Act, dedicates the civil fi nes in the BP case to 
restoration of the Gulf Coast. Under RESTORE, 80% of 
civil penalties go into a fund, with about 65% going to the 
state governments under their control, 30% going to states 
for use in implementing a comprehensive plan for restora-
tion, and the remainder going to the federal government 
for scientifi c research (Randle et al., 2013, p. 10313).
Thus, although the main purpose of penalties is 
to punish past conduct and provide an incentive for fu-
ture behavior, the penalties were also used in this case 
for constructive purposes. They provided the opportu-
nity for a major infl ux of cash to address the long-ne-
glected problems of the Gulf area as well as the specifi c 
harms caused by the spill.
Compensation for Harm 
The framework for compensation from the BP 
spill was shaped by an earlier oil spill. In 1989, the Exxon 
Valdez oil tanker struck a reef near Alaska, resulting in 
an 11 million gallon spill and damaging over a thousand 
miles of shoreline (Sole, 2011, p. 249). The resulting liti-
gation lasted over twenty years, ending when the Su-
preme Court set the level of punitive damages at $500 
million; by then, almost 20% of the original 32,000 plain-
tiffs had died during the course of the litigation (Sole, 
2011, p. 249). Hopefully, the BP case will not last such 
an extended time. As a result of Exxon Valdez, Congress 
passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which amended 
the Clean Water Act with new provisions for compen-
sating victims (Sole, 2011, p. 249-250).
Administrative Compensation
The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) requires “respon-
sible parties” such as BP to establish an administrative 
compensation system in order to ensure speedy pay-
ment to claimants (33 U.S.C. §§ 2712-13). In order to 
promote speedy payment and discourage litigation, the 
statute requires that claimants fi rst seek compensation 
from the fund before they can go to court (33 U.S.C. § 
2713). This provision was the basis for BP’s administra-
tive compensation system:
It voluntarily (well, with a little prodding from Presi-
dent Obama) set up  an administrative program, the 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), that aim ed to 
fully compensate all of the victims of the spill. The 
GCCF’s funding was uncapped. BP brought in the 
nation’s preeminent independent claims administra-
tor, Kenneth Feinberg, to run the program, free from 
BP’s interference. BP paid all of the expenses. And it 
backed up all of this by setting aside $20 billion in a 
trust fund, with an open-ended commitment should 
that amount prove insuffi cient (Issacharoff and Rave, 
2014, p. 398).
In a year and a half of operation, the fund paid 
over $6 billion to 220,000 claimants (Issacharoff and 
Rave, 2014, p. 400). It provided interim payments for 
past harm including lost earnings and business profi ts, 
removal and cleanup costs, physical damage, and injury 
(Sole, 2011, p. 250). In returning for signing a release, 
claimants with small claims could obtain $5000 (for indi-
viduals) or $25,000 (for businesses) as Quick Payments 
(Sole, 2011, p. 251).
Final Payments were another option, and they 
included a multiplier (called a recovery factor) to esti-
mate future losses based on past losses; these payments 
also required a release for all liability, unlike the interim 
payments (Sole, 2011, p. 251). Initially, the multiplier was 
two for all claims except for the oyster industry, where 
it was four, but later the multiplier of four was extended 
to the rest of the shellfi sh industry (Issacharoff and Rave, 
2014, p. 405). The GCCF estimated business losses by 
comparing the claimant’s revenue from the remainder 
of 2010 to either its projected revenue in the remainder 
of 2010 or its best eight months in 2008 or 2009, with 
an offset for avoided expenses after the spill (Issacharoff 
and Rave, 2014, p. 407).
The great advantage of this claim procedure is 
that it can provide immediate help for victims, who of-
ten cannot afford to wait years for litigation in court 
to come to a conclusion. Yet there is also the risk that 
desperate victims will be forced to give up their rights in 
exchange for inadequate compensation. But a claims fa-
cility of this kind, if properly designed, can avoid hardship 
to local residents and help an impacted area recover 
from the economic effects of a spill.
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Judicial Compensation for Economic Loss
Tort law in the United States is mainly a mat-
ter of state law, and in the forty-nine states with com-
mon law traditions12 it is largely judge-made. Liability for 
offshore oil spills is an exception on both counts: it is 
largely federal rather than state, and largely statutory 
rather than judge-made. 
Several federal laws impose liability for oil spills. 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) amend-
ments of 1978 established liability for cleanup costs and 
damages resulting from OCS activities and created the 
Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund. The amendments ap-
ply to offshore facilities and to vessels carrying oil from 
such facilities. Strict liability for cleanup costs and dam-
ages is imposed jointly and severally on the owner and 
operator, subject to monetary caps. These caps, how-
ever, are not applicable if an incident is caused by willful 
misconduct or gross negligence, or by knowing violation 
of federal safety regulations. The Fund, which is derived 
from a fee of three cents per barrel imposed on the 
owner of oil obtained from the OCS, is liable for all 
losses not otherwise compensated.
Until 1990, the broadest liability for spills was im-
posed by § 311 of the Clean Water Act. It made vessels 
strictly liable for cleanup costs incurred by the govern-
ment unless the owner proved that the spill was solely 
a result of an act of God, an act of war, an act or omis-
sion of a third party, or negligence by the federal gov-
ernment. These exceptions from liability were narrowly 
construed. Section 311 also placed limits on damages. 
The risk of environmental disaster in coastal wa-
ters became utterly unmistakable on March 24, 1989, 
when the Exxon Valdez ran into a reef, creating the 
worst oil spill in U.S. history. Over 240,000 barrels of 
oil were released, with environmental effects lasting for 
years. For the Exxon Valdez, the limit would have come 
to $32 million. However, the limits were not applicable if 
the government could show that the discharge was due 
to “willful negligence or willful misconduct within the 
privity and knowledge of the owner.”
More than a hundred law fi rms were involved 
in over 200 suits, involving more than 30,000 claims. 
The total damage claims exceeded $50 billion. Although 
some of these claims were settled or dismissed, over 
10,000 remained and resulted in hundreds of millions 
of dollars in damages. There was also a large award of 
punitive damages. But there was dissatisfaction about 
the outcome:
Based on the vast extent of litigation and multi-bil-
lion-dollar judgments awarded against Exxon, a casual 
observer might acquire an impression that the legal 
system fully compensated the losses suffered by those 
impacted by the spill. However, the legal system in 
fact denied redress to many plaintiffs who lost most 
of their livelihoods as a result of damage to natural 
resources. Many plaintiffs also did not receive com-
pensation for non-market-based, intangible values that 
the resources had given them (Bardwick, 2000, p. 259).
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (33 U.S.C.A. § 
2701 et seq.) replaced the liability provisions of § 311. 
Section 1002 imposes liability on “each responsible 
party” for removal costs, damage to natural resources, 
damages “for injury to, or economic losses, resulting 
from destruction of, real or personal property,” and lost 
profi ts “due to the injury, destruction, or loss of any real 
property, personal property, or natural resources, which 
shall be recoverable by any claimant.” “Responsible par-
ties” are defi ned in § 1001(32) to include the owners 
and operators of vessels, on-shore facilities, or pipelines. 
The statute provides for unlimited liability if the spill 
is caused by gross negligence, willful misconduct, or a 
safety violation. 
There are strong arguments for using a strict li-
ability standard for oil spills:
A negligence standard requires both a determina-
tion of the standard of care used to judge negligence 
and a determination of whether the oil fi rm met that 
standard. Either of these determinations would be a 
challenging task. Oil-drilling operations are extremely 
complex and require specialized expertise – and even 
with such expertise, fully understanding the appropri-
ate levels of care is extremely diffi cult for outside ob-
servers (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2011, p. 1745).
The current statutory scheme is a hybrid, provid-
ing strict liability up to a cap, but requiring a showing of 
serious fault thereafter. 
Multiple lawsuits were fi led against BP for eco-
nomic loss. Hundreds of cases, involving thousands of in-
dividual claimants plus class actions, were consolidated 
in front of a federal district judge in Louisiana (Issacha-
roff and Rave, 2014, p. 400). The proceedings involved 
“scores of expert reports, hundreds of depositions, and 
more than 90 million pages of discovery documents” 
(Issacharoff and Rave, 2014, p. 401). BP changed its em-
phasis from the administrative fund (the GCCF) to liti-
gation settlement:
12 The state of Louisiana’s legal system has French rather than English roots.
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As the claims by numerous private and public parties 
were heading to trial, BP decided to shift strategies 
away from the GCCF model. Instead of the one-by-
one offer and acceptance model of the GCCF, BP and 
the private lawyers organized as the Plaintiffs’ Steering 
Committee [...] reached an agreement on a plan to 
settle the economic and property damage claims, as 
well as claims for medical injury for individuals who 
were not on the Deepwater Horizon drilling platform 
(e.g., clean-up workers exposed to oil or chemical dis-
persants) on a comprehensive basis. The parties nego-
tiated two class action settlements that, after notice to 
class members and court approval, replaced the GCCF 
with a court-supervised claims resolution facility that, 
like the GCCF, also aimed to fully compensate victims 
of the spill (Issacharoff and Rave, 2014, p. 401-402).
Intriguingly, the settlements were overall more 
favorable to the injured parties than the claims admin-
istration. Specifi cally, the settlements provided more 
generous mechanisms for estimating future economic 
harm based on lost revenue immediately after the spill 
(Issacharoff and Rave, 2014, p. 404-412). These mecha-
nisms were necessarily approximations because of the 
need to avoid litigating the extent of future lost prof-
its in every individual case. BP’s willingness to agree to 
such generous terms was probably attributable to the 
greater degree of fi nality provided by class action settle-
ments, which gave it fi nality in terms of potential future 
claims (Issacharoff and Rave, 2014, p. 426-427). Despite 
congressional hopes that the administrative mechanism 
would benefi t all parties because of its lower transac-
tion costs, the class action had some superior qualities 
that it could not replicate: “[t]he GCCF, for all its ef-
forts to rapidly provide compensation to an astounding 
number of claimants in a streamlined, low-cost process, 
could not measure up to the class action settlement’s 
ability to deliver fi nality—even at a greater cost—in a 
fair and equitable manner” (Issacharoff and Rave, 2014, 
p. 431). Apparently, in order to get the fi nality resulting 
from a settlement of the class action, BP was willing to 
show more generosity in the amounts of the recoveries.
The class action involved an enormous number 
of claims for economic loss due to the spill. As to some 
subsets of those claims, the settlement provides that 
claimants in some particular industries and areas need 
only prove that they suffered an economic loss and cer-
tify (under pain of perjury) that the losses were caused 
by BP. 
The reason for streamlining evidence of causa-
tion in this way is simply that it can be enormously com-
plex to determine how a disaster impacted a business’s 
profi ts. Doing so requires that we reconstruct what the 
business’s profi ts would have been in the absence of a 
disaster. Even in a case where a business was clearly fac-
ing other problems, a disaster may have prevented the 
business from responding effectively to those challenges, 
to an extent that may be diffi cult to establish after the 
fact. By reducing proof of causation to a bare minimum 
in regions and business sectors where causation was 
most likely to have existed, the settlement made the 
processing of claims much more effi cient. The side-ef-
fect, however, was to increase the likelihood that some 
claimants would receive more compensation than they 
would have gotten if there had been a full inquiry into 
the facts of their cases.
Tort law generally does not provide compensa-
tion for economic harms from a wrongful act in the 
absence of some physical harm to the plaintiff. Thus, at 
common law, lost profi ts resulting from an oil spill could 
be recovered only by plaintiffs whose property experi-
enced physical contact with the oil. That would mean 
that the oil company would escape liability for much of 
the harm caused by the spill. Federal law expands the 
scope of oil company liability, but as a result can open 
the door to diffi cult questions regarding proof of causa-
tion and measurement of damages. The settlement was 
designed to avoid costly disputes about these matters 
in the areas and industries where the claimants were 
mostly likely to have been harmed by the spill.
BP argued that the settlement (as implemented) 
required payment even in cases where the claim form it-
self raises questions about causation. It complained that 
it might have to make payments in cases where a busi-
ness would have closed for some obvious reason apart 
from the spill. One element of standing is that an injury 
be “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s actions. Hence, 
according to BP, those class members lack standing, and 
since standing is jurisdictional, even BP’s agreement to 
pay them cannot make them part of the case.
In theory, issues relating to Article III jurisdiction 
cannot be waived. The Supreme Court has held that the 
kind of showing to be made regarding standing depends 
on the procedural stage of the case. In order to allow 
the settlement process to function, the burden of proof 
on members of the class must be light. Otherwise, it 
would be impossible to settle a mass tort case since 
the court would have to conduct a hearing about in-
jury, causation and the existence of at least some legally 
compensable damage for every member of the class to 
ensure that it had jurisdiction. So the only question in 
this particular case is whether the bar is quite as low as 
simply stating causation under penalty of perjury (even 
when other portions of the form raise questions about 
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causation). The courts have ruled against BP on this is-
sue: In re Deepwater Horizon, 744 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2014) 
reh’g denied, 13-30315, 2014 WL 2118983 (5th Cir. May 
19, 2014). As a matter of common sense, it is hard to 
see why BP should be released from its own voluntary 
settlement agreement.
Judicial Compensation for Harm to 
Natural Resources
The statute also provides compensation for 
harm to natural resources in suits by public entities. 
It requires the President to issue regulations govern-
ing the measurement of damages for injury to natural 
resources. Measuring damages for injuries to natural 
areas poses interesting issues. Section 100 6(d) (1) of 
the 1990 Oil Pollution Act provides that the measure of 
natural resource damages is:
(a)  the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, 
or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged 
natural resources;
(b)  the diminution in value of those natural re-
sources pending restoration; plus
(c)  the reasonable cost of assessing those dam-
ages.
These costs are to be assessed with respect to 
the restoration plans promulgated by federal or state 
trustees. Section 106(e) requires the President to issue 
damage assessment regulations; damage determinations 
pursuant to those regulations enjoy a rebuttable pre-
sumption of correctness (Viscusi and Zeckhauser, 2011, 
p. 1746).
In theory, valuation should include the amount 
people are willing to pay for the continued existence 
of a natural resource that they do not currently use 
and have no immediate plans to use. A method known 
as “contingent valuation” has been used to assess this 
“nonuse value” through survey questions. There is con-
siderable controversy about the reliability of this meth-
odology. In Ohio v. Lujan (880 F.2d 432 [D.C.Cir.1989]), 
the court held that the regulations must cover “non-
use values,” which can only be measured presently us-
ing contingent valuation. The Secretary of the Interior 
issued new and more fl exible valuation rules for as-
sessing natural resource damages from toxic wastes. 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) developed parallel rules under the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990. These rules were upheld in General 
Electric Co. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, (128 F.3d 
767 [D.C.Cir.1997]). The court found the Ohio ruling 
decisive regarding the general legitimacy of contingent 
valuation. Any claims that a particular contingent valua-
tion was performed without adequate safeguards could 
be addressed in a later enforcement proceeding. 
In the BP case, BP agreed to pay an early restora-
tion fee of $1 billion before the extent of the natural 
resources claim was determined (Randle et al., 2013, 
p. 10313). The government will then request that BP take 
part in a “cooperative assessment” of the damage and 
the cost of restoration (Randle et al., 2013, p. 10314).
One of the components of damages under § 
1006 is the cost of restoration. Arguably, only restora-
tion can fully compensate the public for loss of a natural 
area (Wendel, 1991). But restoration may not always be 
practical, or at least may be delayed or incomplete. This 
possibility requires the court to assess damages based 
on the inherent value of the natural resources, which 
can be diffi cult since many ecological benefi ts are not 
traded in markets. At that point, contingent valuation 
comes into play.
Conclusion
The BP Oil Spill established three things beyond 
doubt. First, deep water oil drilling poses substantial 
risks, including widespread economic harm if a massive 
spill occurs. Second, the industry cannot be relied upon 
to police itself without government oversight. Third, 
compensating the victims of a spill can be an extremely 
large and diffi cult task, placing heavy demands upon the 
legal system.
In the case of the BP Oil Spill, the United States 
legal system has done a credible job of compensating 
victims and stands ready to assess additional damages 
for ecological harm. This outcome is due in no small part 
to the statutory reforms enacted after the previous ma-
jor spill in 1989 (Exxon Valdez). It is also due to the 
adroit use of administrative compensation and settle-
ment procedures, with no small credit to the force of 
public opinion and government pressure on BP to show 
its goodwill.
On the regulatory side, there seems to be a con-
scientious effort to upgrade safety measures in the in-
dustry. It remains to be seen whether the “safety case” 
approach, which does count on some degree of coopera-
tion by industry, will be successful after the initial pressure 
on the industry following the BP Spill subsides over time. 
A more conventional regulatory approach would clearly 
require a major investment of resources to maintain a 
large staff of government experts and inspectors, which 
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does not seem to be available at this time. We can only 
hope that the BP Spill represents a turning point for the 
industry internationally, and that other countries such as 
Brazil are able to profi t from the U.S. experience.
The era of deep water oil drilling will eventually 
come to an end, due to technical limitations, restricted 
reserves, or global concerns about climate change. In 
the meantime, however, it will remain a lucrative, large-
scale activity. It must be a priority to ensure that the 
damage from this activity is minimized. When accidents 
do happen, the costs of accidents must fall on the recipi-
ents of those large profi ts rather than on coastal resi-
dents and ocean ecosystems.
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